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Response to “Ethanol Production and Gasoline Prices: 
A Spurious Correlation” by Knittel and Smith 
 
Dermot Hayes 
 
Introduction 
In a recent working paper, Christopher Knittel and Aaron Smith present an attack on a peer-
reviewed paper “The Impact of Ethanol Production on US and Regional Gasoline Markets 
Relating Ethanol Production to Gasoline Prices" written by myself and Xiaodong Du, and 
published in 2009 in Energy Policy (Vol. 37 No.8), as well as two subsequent working papers in 
2011 and 2012. Our work found that as ethanol production increased, the price of gasoline fell 
relative to the price of crude oil. Knittel and Smith claim to have refuted this result, and conclude 
that their “Empirical models that are most consistent with economic theory suggest effects that 
are near zero and statistically insignificant.” 
 
This topic is of current relevance because of the current drought in the Corn Belt, and it is an 
issue where attention should be paid. The Knittel and Smith paper however, misrepresents our 
work and is presented in a mean-spirited and accusatory manner. The tone of their paper was 
picked up in a recent editorial by the Wall Street Journal that we discuss below.1  
 
A distinguished colleague, who is well known to all of us, sent the following email to me when 
he voluntarily wrote to warn me about the working paper: 
 
“This is not a friendly or professional way to argue against particular empirical results. 
There are better ways to criticize others’ work.” 
 
Given the way the paper was written and presented, it is clear that Knittel and Smith were out to 
discredit our work and imply that our results were influenced by the ethanol industry and that our 
results were mined to suit that industry. Nothing could be further from the truth. 
 
For example, the cover page of the Knittel and Smith working paper includes a statement that 
“Neither author received financial support from relevant stakeholders for this study.” Our paper, 
																																																								
1	See	http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444184704577589812320819988.html	
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as published in Energy Policy has no such claim, and by inference, Knittel and Smith infer that 
outside funding influenced our paper. For the record, there was no outside funding—Xiaodong 
Du provided his time on this paper as part of his unfunded dissertation work, and I provided my 
time as part of regular research duties.  
 
Knittel and Smith make an issue out of the lack of explanation found in the 2011 and 2012 
updates, but these papers are simply mechanistic re-runs of the gasoline price results from the 
original paper. There is no excuse for stating that the methods we used in these updates were 
unclear or unexplained because we explicitly tell the reader that the explanations are found in the 
Energy Policy paper. We relied on industry funds to run the updates and state this very clearly in 
both working papers. 
 
An example of the tone Knittel and Smith take in their paper is their claim that the particular 
model structure we use is “a curious choice.” What they do not tell readers is that we estimated 
and provided results for the alternative model that they propose. 
 
Many of the errors in the Knittel and Smith paper could have been addressed had they simply 
asked us for our data and input. We could have saved them countless hours of data collection and 
coding had they let us know they were interested, and we would have been happy to explain our 
work and our conclusions. This would have been standard academic practice. 
 
Immediate Policy Relevance 
The editorial and others that have used the Knittel and Smith paper sets up a false dichotomy: If 
you believe there is an ethanol price impact, you serve the ethanol industry. But if you believe 
there is no impact, then you serve the petroleum and food industries. This is simply wrong. 
Below, I present a realistic example of how our research is beneficial to any industry that uses 
corn. I have been using this example in extension talks and pork industry presentations.   
 
The renewable fuel standard for 2013 effectively mandates that 13.8 billion gallons of corn 
ethanol be blended in gasoline.2 This output level will require slightly more than 5 billion 
bushels of corn. Because of the drought in the Midwest, it now appears that the US corn crop 
																																																								
2 See Schnepf, R. and Yacobucci, B. 2010. Renewable fuel standard (RFS): overview and issues, U.S. Congress 
Research Service, Washington, DC. CRS R40155  
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will fall to less than 11 billion bushels. If the mandate is binding in 2013, then approximately 
half of US corn production will be consumed by an industry that is not sensitive to price. 
 
Suppose that political and economic circumstances in spring of 2013 are such that the United 
States decides to relax the mandate. This might happen because of a devastating cull in the US 
livestock breeding herd or poor weather in the southern hemisphere in the October to March 
growing season. If we are right about the ethanol to gas price linkage, a sudden closure of ethanol 
facilities (equivalent to closing 7% to 10% of our crude oil refining capacity) just prior to the 
summer driving season will cause a large increase in gasoline prices. High gasoline prices will lead 
to elevated ethanol prices and allow the ethanol industry to remain in business without the 
mandate. The problem will last at least until new corn crop becomes available in October 2013. 
 
This outcome is avoidable. The obvious solution is to announce a relaxation of the 2013 mandate 
now. This will provide time for the United States to import, and then stockpile, gasoline to 
prepare for a downturn in ethanol production. With the appropriate market incentives, ethanol 
use would be restricted to 6% blends to enhance the octane level of poor quality fuel. If there is 
no link between ethanol production and gasoline prices as some have used the Knittel and Smith 
paper to claim, then the price impact of ethanol closures is not a concern. 
 
Next, we provide an explanation for why we wrote the paper, as this helps explain our motives 
and our model structure. We do this because a reading of the Knittel and Smith paper would lead 
one to conclude that we purposefully mined the data to publish the biggest gasoline price impact 
that we could, and that we used the crack ratio for this purpose. 
 
Motivation for the Energy Policy paper 
In the fall of 2006, we were part of a group that predicted a major increase in corn prices.3 The 
logic was that corn should sell at its energy value when sold as ethanol. This 2006 paper linked 
the price of corn to the price of crude oil. In late 2007, we noticed that the formula we had 
developed was not working as well as it had earlier. The corn to ethanol link did not cause the 
problem. Instead, to our surprise, what was breaking down was the gasoline to crude oil link. We 
wrote the Energy Policy paper to help us understand why this link was not working, and we 
incorporated the impacts we discovered there in our CARD-FAPRI model system. 
 
																																																								
3 See http://www.card.iastate.edu/publications/synopsis.aspx?id=1029 
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Because we were interested in the relative prices of gasoline and crude oil, we focused on the 
ratio of gasoline to crude oil prices. We adjusted this simple ratio to allow us to directly compare 
the gasoline prices with crude oil prices by first dividing the crude oil price by 42. Figure 1 
shows the ratio. 
 
 
Source: http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_allmg_d_nus_pwa_dpgal_m.htm 
FIGURE 1. Gasoline and crude oil crack ratios from Jan. 1986–Sep. 2011 
 
As can be seen from the long-term data in the figure above, the crack ratio is stable up to the year 
2000. After this, the ratio falls by about 30%, and this is what was causing the trouble with our 
corn price projection model. 
 
In the Knittel and Smith paper, they argue that if we were interested in the behavior of the 
refining industry, then we should have used an alternative measure called the crack spread. This 
is the weighted average of the gasoline and distillate products produced by a barrel of crude oil, 
minus the cost of the crude. They make a major issue of this point and constantly refer to the 
difference in results between the crack ratio and the crack spread. It leaves the reader with the 
distinct and false impression that we did not use this measure because it did not support our 
desired results. 
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This assertion is puzzling because our paper clearly provides a full set of results for both the crack 
spread and the crack ratio. In fact, Table 1 of the original paper presents the crack spread results 
right beside the crack ratio results. We have reproduced this table below to reinforce this point. 
 
 
Source: Du and Hayes 2009. 
 
The estimate of the impact of ethanol on refiner’s profit that we report in our paper is clearly 
provided in the summary of the results. We explain the importance of these measures below.  
 
Basic Economics 
The $1.33 per barrel reduction in the crack spread that we report corresponds to a $0.032 per 
gallon reduction in the refiner’s profit. Our gasoline price impact is $0.14 per gallon. This means 
that the decline in refiners profits accounts for only 24% of the gasoline price reduction. We 
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conclude that the difference must have arisen because the refiners charged more for other 
distillates or found efficiencies in the production process. Given the sophisticated management in 
the oil industry, it is difficult to see why they would simply accept a 1:1 deterioration in their 
profit margin as ethanol forced gasoline prices down.  
 
Knittel and Smith assume that all of the change in gasoline prices must have come directly from 
the refiner’s profit margin. They use the change in refiner’s profits and the change in gasoline 
prices interchangeably, as shown in their quotation below: 
 
“We calculate the ethanol effect from the crack spread models as the implied increase in 
the crack spread from eliminating all ethanol production. We then assume that gasoline 
prices rise by this amount, based on the notion expressed in Section 2 that ethanol 
reduces the refining margin by relaxing capacity constraints and thereby reduces the 
prices of the refined products.” (Emphasis added.) 
 
They then assume that the estimated change in crack spread ($0.032) is a gasoline price change, 
and report getting a lower gasoline price change with the crack spread model. It is by means of 
this unrealistic assumption that they provide “evidence” that gasoline prices did not fall by the 
$0.14 per gallon we had reported.  
 
In our original paper, we did not pursue the other possible causes for the difference between the 
change in gasoline price and the change in the refiner’s margin. Figure 2 shows what happened 
to the value of the profits the refiners made from other distillates. This would seem to suggest 
that refiners do in fact have the ability to stabilize their profits by charging more for some 
outputs when the market for gasoline is weak. 
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Source: http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_allmg_d_nus_pwa_dpgal_m.htm 
FIGURE 2. Profit from crude oil distillates Jan. 1983–May 2011 
 
The Knittel and Smith paper repeatedly infers that we biased the results because we did not 
report the impact of ethanol on gasoline prices using the crack spread model. So let us be very 
clear about this—we estimated two equations and reported two sets of results. The first 
equation has the relative price of gasoline on the left hand side. We use this equation to report 
gasoline price impacts. The second equation has the margin made by refiners on the left hand 
side. We use this equation to report the impact of ethanol on refiner’s margin.  
 
There is no way to use the refiners margin equation to measure the impact on gasoline prices, 
unless one is prepared to make the completely unrealistic assumption that for every penny by 
which gasoline prices are reduced the refining industry takes a one penny reduction in profit. If this 
assumption were true then the measure of the profits from distillates shown above would be 
perfectly flat. Knittel and Smith make this flawed assumption and use the second equation to 
report gasoline price impacts, when in fact they are reporting changes in refiner’s profits. Because 
we call the change in margin exactly that — a “change in margin” and not a change in gasoline 
prices, their paper accuses us of hiding this data. They spend pages and pages fretting over this and 
give us a lecture on why the refining industry could not survive if all of the gasoline price impact 
was coming from profits.  
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Knittel and Smith also argue that the refining industry would have expanded capacity had 
ethanol production not surged as it did. Interestingly, this argument (presented on page five of 
their paper) relies on there being an ethanol-to-gas-price link. 
 
We make this same point. In the results section of our paper we stated that: 
 
“The availability of ethanol essentially increased the ‘‘capacity’’ of the US refining 
industry, and in doing so prevented some of the dramatic price increases often associated 
with an industry operating at close to capacity. Because these results are based on 
capacity, it would be wrong to extrapolate the results to today’s markets. Had we not had 
ethanol, it seems likely that the crude oil refining industry would be slightly larger 
today than it actually is, and in the absence of this additional crude oil refining capacity, 
the impact of eliminating ethanol would be extreme.” (Emphasis added.) 
 
While on the subject of basic economics, consider this—ethanol now provides approximately 
10% of the fuel used in gasoline engines. In any other commodity market, a rapid increase in the 
production of a close substitute would be expected to cause a reduction in prices and 
profitability. Why do Knittel and Smith believe the gasoline market would act any differently? 
Consider the following scenario, removing any issue related to ethanol. Suppose that the US 
refining industry found a magical catalyst that allowed it to squeeze 7% to 10% more gasoline 
from each barrel of crude, without impacting the production of other distillates or requiring new 
capacity. Basic economics would say that gasoline prices would fall relative to the price of other 
distillates; and yet if Knittel and Smith are to be believed, there is no indication that this would 
occur. 
 
Another relevant piece of basic economic data is that the United States was a major net importer 
of gasoline at the beginning of our sample period. It is now a net exporter. Although we did not 
explore this trade reversal in our paper, it seems possible that it is due to the widespread 
availability of ethanol. As an importer of gasoline, the United States was paying world gasoline 
prices plus transportation cost, it is now exporting at world prices minus transportation cost. If 
ethanol is responsible for this turn around in trade, then it is surprising the impacts are not any 
greater than we report. 
 
Finally, the price of gasoline was higher than diesel at the beginning of our sample period. Now 
it is significantly lower. We believe that our results explain this. If ethanol is not responsible for 
this, as Knittel and Smith assert, then what is? 
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Big versus Small Impact Numbers 
The abstract of our 2009 paper is provided in its entirety below. 
 
“Our contribution is two-fold. First, ethanol production is found to have a significant 
negative effect of $0.14/gallon (or 8% on average) on wholesale gasoline prices over the 
sample period. The price effect varies over regional markets, with the largest impact in 
the Midwest where regular retail gasoline prices were reduced by $0.28/gallon. The West 
Coast and East Coast are found to have experienced $0.23/gallon and $0.26/gallon 
reductions, respectively, in their retail gasoline prices, while for the Gulf Coast region, 
the average price reduction is about $0.20/gallon. The smallest impact is found in the 
Rocky Mountain region, at $0.07/ gallon, possibly because of its comparatively low 
gasoline and ethanol consumption. Our second contribution is to quantify the welfare 
impacts of ethanol production on multiple agricultural and energy markets, and on overall 
welfare changes. After accounting for the federal corn subsidy and ethanol tax credit, we 
find a net welfare loss of $0.5 billion in 2007.” 
 
We report a national average gasoline price-impact of $0.14 per gallon. This impact is estimated 
for the period 1995–2008 and can loosely be interpreted as the impact of the 4 to 5 billion 
gallons of ethanol that were produced at the mid-point of the data (i.e., 2001–2003). In later 
updates, we added more recent data and reported national average price impacts of $.25 and $.29 
per gallon. This increase in the price impact makes sense because of the rapid increase in ethanol 
production in the more recent period. 
 
Given the trend in the estimated national average impact described above, it is tempting to ask 
what the impact would be of current production levels of 13 billion or 14 billion gallons of 
ethanol. This calculation is of particular relevance given the possibility of lifting the mandate 
described earlier; but there are problems with this calculation. First, the method we use assumes 
that all else, including refining capacity, is held constant at measured levels. Second, we are not 
sure if the impact we measure is linear or not. Will 10 billion gallons have twice the impact of 5 
billion gallons? 
 
Faced with a legitimate need for the estimate, but concerned about its accuracy, we decided to 
provide it, but also provide our reservations about this number. In the quote provided above we 
state that: 
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“Because these results are based on capacity, it would be wrong to extrapolate the results 
to today’s markets” (Du and Hayes 2009). 
 
In case anyone missed this the first time, we also state that: 
 
“These results may be questionable because we multiply a mean coefficient that is 
estimated over the entire sample period against data that is specific to the end of the sample 
period. We can be much more confident in the statistical accuracy of the estimated average 
impact but this estimate is not relevant to the current debate because ethanol production has 
surged since the mid-point of the historic data” (Du and Hayes 2012). 
 
In their paper, Knittel and Smith ignore these qualifications and chose to cite speeches and press 
releases by others over whom we had no control. They then imply that we provided calculations 
without qualifications and used them in ways that we did not.  
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Knittel and Smith provide a series of sensitivity analyses that purport to show that our results are 
too large. Instead of comparing our national average results against theirs, they focus on the 
marginal results and compare our 2010 marginal results against theirs. They do this analysis for 
the crack spread and crack ratio. 
 
As we have discussed before, the Knittel and Smith measure found using the crack spread is 
actually a measure of the change in refiner’s margin. We had already reported that this change 
was smaller than the change in gas prices. We will therefore focus this discussion on the crack 
ratio comparison. These results are in Table 1 of their paper. 
 
The marginal impact for 2010 reported in our paper is $0.89 per gallon. Knittel and Smith 
essentially reproduce this result using our data and model and report an impact of $0.86 per 
gallon. They then add the price of crude oil as an explanatory variable and the estimated impact 
falls to $0.48 per gallon. When they add crude oil and natural gas, the impact falls to $0.35. This 
sensitivity analysis is relevant only if it makes sense to add crude oil and natural gas. Knittel and 
Smith assert that these are added because crude oil and natural gas are important costs incurred 
in operating a refinery. This logic might make sense in a model that is trying to explain refinery 
margin, but it makes no sense in a model that is attempting to explain the relative prices of 
gasoline and crude oil. 
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The dependent variable in our regression is the price of gasoline divided by the price of crude oil. 
The addition of crude oil on the right hand side will obviously cause endogeneity and bias the 
parameters.  
 
That these two experienced econometricians had to resort to an alternative regression model that 
has the crude oil price on the left and the right hand sides of the estimated regression shows how 
hard they must have tried to find an alternative model that reduced our estimate. 
 
Unrelated Variables 
The most bizarre part of the Knittel and Smith paper is when they elect to make their point by 
replacing our dependent variables with the price of natural gas, the unemployment rate, and the 
age of their kids. 
 
If it were really true that our results are simply due to a coincidental upward trend in ethanol 
production at a time when the crack ratio was falling, then our paper would not have withstood 
the peer-review process and would not and should not have been published. As can be seen from 
the table of results reproduced above from our study, we controlled for every variable that we 
could think of that might impact the crack spread and the crack ratio. 
 
When Knittel and Smith chose to make their point by using our model to explain unemployment 
(and the other unrelated variables), they used the same control variables that we used. However, 
our control variables were chosen to explain behavior in the crude oil market and have nothing to 
do with unemployment. Had Knittel and Smith properly controlled for the forces that might 
influence unemployment (or the unrelated natural gas or age questions), then the “impact” of 
ethanol on those would disappear, as would their intended point.  
 
Knittel and Smith claim that “Because ethanol production increased smoothly during the sample 
period, statistical analysis with this variable is fraught with danger.” This is not true. Figure 5 in 
their paper shows that ethanol production grew quite slowly up to 2007 and then accelerated 
rapidly. Moreover, there is clear month-to-month variation in output as large new plants came on 
line and as plants closed for seasonal vacations. The method we used takes advantage of this 
variability to tease out ethanol specific impacts. 
 
Ethanol consumption grew at different rates in each of the regions we modeled. For example, 
adoption was far greater in the Midwest than in the Rocky Mountain region. Again, we used this 
regional disparity to measure regional price impacts. These results show that areas where ethanol 
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adoption was greatest also experienced the greatest changes in the crack ratio. Knittel and Smith 
ignore this aspect of our work. (In their facetious example on unemployment, they do not attempt 
to show that regional unemployment trended up in proportion to ethanol use. They do not report 
this because they cannot—unemployment has been lower in Midwestern states.) 
 
Citing this part of the paper, the Wall Street Journal editorial states that: 
 
“The claim that ethanol cuts gas prices is so silly that Messrs. Knittel and Smith have a 
little fun. To show how silly, they take "the same empirical models" Messrs. Du and 
Hayes used and replace the crack spread with the unemployment rate. The model then 
"proves" that if the U.S. had eliminated ethanol production in 2010, joblessness would 
have plunged by 60%, a finding that is statistically significant. Of course, their practical 
joke only shows that unemployment was rising when ethanol was also rising, even 
though ethanol has little to do with jobs. Whatever trend you plug into this model, 
ethanol becomes the cause. They use the model to show that every million barrels of 
ethanol cause Mr. Knittel's son Caiden to become 26 days older, while eliminating 
ethanol in 2010 would have caused Mr. Smith's daughter Hayley to have a negative age.” 
 
 
On a personal note, what I find most troubling is that the two authors’ efforts to gain attention 
and score points come at the expense of my co-author, a new, untenured assistant professor at a 
prestigious university. Knittel and Smith are tenured professors who should serve as examples of 
mentoring and growing the academic reputation of young faculty. That they found this exercise 
to be a fun and humorous project is both a surprise and disappointment.  
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